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Financial Stress Dynamics in the MENA Region: 
Evidence from the Arab Spring 
 
 
Abstract 
 
 
In this paper we analyse the impact of instability caused by the Arab Spring on the co-
movements and volatility spillovers of aggregated Financial Stress Indices for eight MENA 
countries. Using a dynamic frequency connectedness framework, we conclude that stress 
transmission between markets is higher at low frequencies than at high frequencies, which 
implies that MENA markets are slow in adjusting to the information they receive. The Global 
Financial Crisis generated stronger spillover effects between MENA markets than the 
political turmoil of the Arab Spring. These results are useful for investors with different 
investment horizons, and have policy implications for the maintenance of financial stability 
in this region.  
 
Keywords: financial stress indexes; dynamic frequency connectedness; spillover effect; 
MENA economies; impact of Arab Spring. 
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1. Introduction 
 
There is no doubt that the study of financial contagion and volatility spillover effects 
within markets and across countries has gained increased attention from academic researchers 
and policymakers in the MENA region, and worldwide, following the Global Financial Crisis 
and collapse of world financial markets in 2007/2008. In the context of the MENA region, 
empirical literature has focused mainly on financial contagion and volatility transmission 
among stock markets in either MENA countries themselves or MENA and advanced 
economies. This is due to the central role played by stock markets in advancing economic 
development processes in those countries, such as facilitating risk diversification, 
encouraging capital allocations and savings mobilisation, as well as easing the trade in goods, 
services, and financial contracts (Levine, 1997). Recent studies that investigated 
interdependence between stock markets in the MENA region include Chau, Deesomsak, and 
Wang (2014), Lagoarde-Segot and Lucey (2009) and Neaime (2005, 2016). Other papers 
have focused on volatility spillover and interconnectedness between MENA stock markets 
and advanced equity markets (see e. g., Darrat, Elkhal, & Hakim, 2000; Graham, Kiviaho, 
Nikkinen, & Omran, 2013; Maghyereh, Awartani, & Hilu, 2015; Neaime, 2012.). 
More recently, the MENA region has witnessed the political turmoil known as the ‘Arab 
Spring’, which refers to a series of anti-government protests, pro-democracy uprisings, and 
armed rebellions against existing political regimes in a number of MENA countries. Such 
protests began in Tunisia in late 2010 and rapidly spread to other Arab countries by early 
2011, including Morocco, Libya, Egypt, Bahrain, Yemen, and Syria. This revolutionary wave 
has led to a number of political changes, ranging from governmental overthrow and political 
reforms in some countries, to the establishment of new legal frameworks and the introduction 
of new policies and regulations in others. As political uncertainty and risks intensified in the 
region, investor confidence deteriorated and CDS spread expanded (Ghosh, 2016). 
Consequently, Standard and Poor cut the rating of five MENA countries in March 2011. 
Major political events such as the Arab Spring are more likely to have a profound impact 
on financial markets volatilities and interconnectedness due to their social and economic 
implications (Chau et al., 2014). Despite the importance of this event, prior studies have, in 
the main, examined the impact of political uncertainty that emerged due to political events 
such as elections and terrorist attacks. Very little attention has been paid to the effects of 
political instability caused by civil revolutions, such as those of the Arab Spring, on stability 
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and the interconnectedness of financial markets (Chau et al., 2014). In addition, these studies 
focused only on one dimension of the financial markets in MENA countries; either the stock 
market or the banking sector.  
Current literature examining financial interconnectedness and volatility spillovers in 
MENA countries is limited to volatility transmission among stock markets. No previous 
attempt has been made to study the volatility spillover among MENA economies based on a 
more comprehensive approach that takes into account the aggregate effects of banking 
sectors, stock markets, and foreign exchange markets in an integrated framework. 
Furthermore, to the best of our knowledge, no previous study has addressed the impact of 
political uncertainty caused by the Arab Spring on aggregated Financial Stress Indices for 
MENA countries.  
In particular, this study seeks answers to the following questions:  
 What are the key driving force(s) behind the dynamic co-movement of financial 
distress between MENA economies? 
 Which country is the net transmitter/receiver of financial stress?  
 What is the impact of global financial crises and political instability caused by the 
Arab Spring on co-movements and stress spillovers among the MENA countries?  
In answering these questions, this article adds to the existing literature in several 
important ways. First, this paper examines financial stress co-movements and volatility 
transmission in MENA countries. In contrast to previous research, this study does not limit 
the analysis to volatility transmission and interconnectedness in MENA stock market indices 
(Chau, Deesomsak and Wang, 2014). Instead, it adopts a more comprehensive approach that 
takes into account the potential risk and volatility spillover from banking sectors and foreign 
exchange markets, as well as stock markets. Second, to the best of our knowledge, while 
earlier studies have focused mainly on the effect of the Arab Spring on either stock markets 
or banks in MENA countries, we analyse the impact of political instability caused by the 
Arab Spring on co-movements and volatility spillovers of aggregated Financial Stress Indices 
for eight MENA countries. Following the paper by Apostolakis and Papadopoulos (2014), 
which used the Financial Stress Index as a proxy variable and to account for financial 
instability in its analysis of stress co-movements across G7 countries, we employ a similar 
approach for MENA economies. Third, we have extended the analysis by splitting the full 
sample into three sub-samples in order to compare the impact of the Global Financial Crisis 
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in 2007/2008 and the Arab Spring in 2011/2012 on the stability and dynamic 
interconnectedness of the financial systems in the selected MENA countries. 
Finally, yet significantly, this study employs an innovative econometric technique, 
recently developed by Barunik and Krehlik (2015, 2018), namely the frequency 
connectedness method, to examine the volatility spillovers and dynamic interdependence of 
financial stress in MENA countries. This approach enables the identification of the dynamics 
and level of intensity of cross-national volatility spillovers between FSIs of the selected 
MENA countries in time-frequency domain. In contrast to Diebold and Yilmaz (2012), this 
framework uses spectral representations of variance decomposition locally to retrieve time-
frequency. Furthermore, dynamic interactions between FSIs of MENA countries have been 
taken into account by considering both the average and time-variations of total and net 
directional financial stress that indicate financial innovations and spillover dynamics over 
time. 
Our findings provide a clear view of the transmission of financial stress during key 
episodes, particularly, the dynamics and intensity of spillovers in different frequency 
domains. The results are useful for investors with different investment horizons since in this 
paper we show how quickly MENA markets can adjust to the information transmitted from 
other markets. The impact of both the Global Financial Crisis and the Arab Spring on the 
dynamics of stress transmission is explored and explained. These results are robust to model 
specification and are consistent with the notion that political uncertainty contributes to 
financial instability and volatility spillovers. Overall, they are of great importance to 
investors, policy-makers, and market regulators for understanding the impact of financial and 
political uncertainty on financial markets. Understanding financial volatility transmission and 
dynamics helps policy-makers and regulators adopt appropriate policy measures to safeguard 
and maintain sound and stable financial systems. 
This paper is organised as follows. Relevant literature is critically analysed and 
presented in the next section. Section 3 outlines the empirical methodology, data sources, and 
the construction of Financial Stress Indices for the selected MENA countries. Empirical 
results from the full sample and three sub-samples, as well as tests to ensure their soundness, 
are presented in Section 4. Finally, Section 5 provides conclusions.  
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2. Literature Review  
 
This paper contributes to two strands of literature on financial transmission and volatility 
spillovers. First, we consider the literature on financial contagion and interconnectedness and 
the main theoretical hypotheses developed in this area. Second, we extend the literature 
review by exploring the effect of political uncertainty on the volatility of financial markets, in 
particular, the impact of political instability caused by the Arab Spring in the MENA region. 
Literature on financial contagion and financial transmission can be traced back to Engle, 
Ito, and Lin (1990) who developed “heat wave” and “meteor shower” hypotheses. According 
to the heat wave hypothesis, financial volatility is a country-specific phenomenon and, hence, 
depends on market fundamentals, whereas the meteor shower hypothesis examines the 
transmission of financial volatility from one country to another. Both the heat wave and 
meteor shower hypotheses have important implications for portfolio management and trading 
strategies. The meteor shower hypothesis also has implications for policy makers and 
financial regulators, since the crisis shock originated in one market can spillover to other 
markets via a variety of channels. Nowadays, none of the financial markets are immune to 
external shocks. The literature stressed the importance of trade and financial linkages as two 
fundamental channels through which financial distress transmits across countries.  
  Glick and Rose (1999) and Forbes (2002) both emphasised the significance of trade 
connections in volatility transmission, while Kaminsky and Reinhart (2000) and Caramazza, 
Ricci, and Salgado (2004) identified financial linkages as a second channel for financial 
spillovers across countries. In addition to these factors, Balakrishnan, Danninger, Elekdag, 
and Tytell (2011) argued that financial stress could be transmitted due to common factors 
affecting several countries such as a global turmoil or crisis. Since then, several attempts have 
been made to study financial contagion and volatility spillovers among financial markets and 
across countries (see, e.g., Apostolakis & Papadopoulos, 2015; Balakrishnan et al., 2011; 
Beirne, Caporale, Schulze-Ghattas, & Spagnolo, 2013; Caramazza et al., 2004; Cardarelli, 
Elekdag, & Lall, 2011; Chau & Deesomsak, 2014; Francis X. Diebold & Yilmaz, 2009; 
Francis X Diebold & Yilmaz, 2012; Yarovaya, Brzeszczyński, & Lau, 2016, among others). 
There is an abundance of literature on MENA economies dealing with financial 
interconnectedness and volatility spillovers. Nevertheless, most of this literature has focused 
on co-movement and contagion between stock markets. For instance, Lagoarde-Segot and 
Lucey (2009) studied the impact of major financial crises (in Asia, Russia, Turkey, and 
Argentina), as well as the 2007/2008 Global Financial Crisis, on the vulnerability of seven 
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stock markets in the MENA region using panel data analysis over the period September 1, 
1997 to March 23, 2009. Empirical findings indicated heterogeneous levels of financial 
volatility and vulnerability over this sample period. Furthermore, the study shows that MENA 
countries are highly connected with developed economies rather than between themselves. 
Neaime (2012, 2016) analysed global contagion and regional financial spillovers in MENA 
and advanced stock markets. Results revealed a weak regional integration between MENA 
stock markets. In addition, the impact of the global financial crises on MENA stock markets 
is heterogeneous and depends on the degree of international financial integration.  
In a similar vein, Maghyereh et al. (2015) used the DCC-GARCH model and spillover 
approach developed by Diebold and Yilmaz (2012) to explore the dynamic correlation of 
both return and volatility transmissions between the U.S. and the five biggest MENA stock 
markets using a dataset for January 2, 1998 to February 15, 2013. Their empirical results of 
dynamic association pre- and post- the Global Financial Crisis conforms well with previous 
literature. They reported an unprecedented jump in dynamic correlations and volatility 
spillovers during the crisis that reverted to normal patterns thereafter. Other studies examined 
contagion vulnerability and financial integration among major stock markets in the MENA 
region that highlighted low levels of correlation and less integration among MENA stock 
markets, particularly in the long run compared with the short run (Lagoarde-Segot & Lucey, 
2007; Neaime, 2005, 2016). 
Another parallel strand of literature documented the adverse impact of political 
uncertainty on returns and the volatility of financial markets (Gemmill, 1992; Li & Born, 
2006; Nippani & Medlin, 2002; Sy & Al Zaman, 2011). Factors engendering political 
instability could be attributed to a number of events such as elections, armed conflict, and 
terrorist attacks. Nevertheless, the majority of the literature on political instability has focused 
more on the reaction of financial markets to political elections. While several studies 
investigated the effects of elections on stock markets (Białkowski, Gottschalk, & Wisniewski, 
2008; Li & Born, 2006; Nippani & Arize, 2005; Nippani & Medlin, 2002; Pástor & Veronesi, 
2013), others focused on the banking sector (Chen & Liu, 2013; Francis, Hasan, & Zhu, 
2014; Önder & Özyıldırım, 2013). In general, the literature has highlighted the importance of 
political uncertainty and its role in generating uncertainty and reinforcing vulnerability in 
financial markets (Batten et al., 2019; Guo et al., 2018; Mei et al., 2018). 
In the context of MENA countries, only a handful of papers have scrutinised the effect of 
political uncertainty caused by the Arab Spring on returns and the stability of financial 
systems. These studies focused on one single dimension of financial markets in MENA 
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countries; either the stock market or the banking sector. Chau et al. (2014) examine the 
impact of political uncertainty caused by the Arab Uprising on stock market volatility in 
MENA countries from the perspective that political instability and uncertainty generates 
higher volatility in financial markets. To this end, three different specifications of the 
GARCH model have been applied to conventional and Islamic stock indices in major MENA 
stock markets (Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Egypt, Jordon, and Lebanon) over the period June 1, 
2009 to June 29, 2012: standard symmetric GARCH, asymmetric GARCH (GJR-GARCH) 
and exponential GARCH (E-GARCH). Results show that the Arab Spring had little or 
insignificant impact on the volatility of conventional stock markets, whereas Islamic stock 
indices witness increased volatility during this period of political unrest. Moreover, findings 
highlighted that MENA stock markets are less integrated with international financial markets.  
Others examined the impact of the Arab Spring on the stability of the banking system in 
the MENA region. For example, Alraheb and Tarazi (2018) investigate the impact of national 
and international shocks on the stability of the banking sector in the MENA region using 
annual bank-level data for 21 MENA countries over the period 2004-2012. Results indicate 
that the Global Financial Crisis of 2007/2008 had a negative impact on the stability of the 
banking sector in the MENA region, whereas the regional crisis, that is political uncertainty 
caused by the Arab Spring, had no impact. Another interesting paper by Ghosh (2016) 
examined the impact of the Arab Spring on return and volatility in 112 banks in 12 MENA 
economies during 2000-2012. Findings show that political uncertainty caused by the Arab 
Spring had an asymmetric impact on return and volatility in banks across the MENA region. 
In other words, political instability lowered profitability and increased risk for banks in 
countries directly hit by the Arab Spring compared with other countries. 
While research in this general area has burgeoned, no previous attempt has been made to  
study the volatility spillover among MENA economies based on a more comprehensive 
approach that takes into account the aggregate effects on the banking sector, stock markets, 
and foreign exchange markets in an integrated framework.  
 Very few attempts have been made to explore the dynamic impact of the Arab Spring on 
either stock markets or the banking sectors in the MENA region. To the best of our 
knowledge, no previous study has examined the impact of political uncertainty caused by the 
Arab Spring on the aggregated Financial Stress Indices of MENA countries. However, 
developing such a broader and inclusive perspective is vital as there are serious implications 
for a number of market players. In addition, understanding how financial shocks are 
transmitted across markets and countries offers invaluable insights for both policymakers and 
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investors seeking portfolio diversification. Such analysis informs the debate on government 
regulation of financial markets, in particular macroprudential policy, with the aim of 
preventing future financial crises.  
 
3. Methodology 
 
3.1 Data and Descriptive Statistics  
 
The dataset used to construct Financial Stress Indices (FSIs) is based on daily 
observations retrieved from the DataStream database over the period December 12, 2005 to 
July 31, 2018, with a total number of 3360 observations covering the Global Financial Crisis 
and most recent events in the region such as the Arab Spring. The sample includes eight 
MENA countries: Bahrain, Egypt, Kuwait, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Turkey and the United 
Arab Emirates, all chosen based on data availability. 
We further divide our sample into pre-, during, and after- Arab Spring periods to 
examine the changes in connectedness. While the beginning of the Arab Spring is easy to 
define since the protests in Tunisia (Jasmine Revolution) arose following Mohamed 
Bouazizi’s self-immolation on December 17, 2010, the end of the Arab Awakening 
movement is not as precise. In this paper, we consider the period from December 17, 2010 to 
December 31, 2012 as the Arab Spring as these dates include the protests that erupted in 
Egypt on November 22, 2012, and which we identify as the final events that can be attributed 
to the Arab Spring and its immediate aftermath. The period from 2013 to 2015 is also often 
considered as part of the Arab Spring aftermath. However, events in that period are also 
related to the escalation of the conflict in Syria and the growth of the Islamic State, which 
cannot be attributed to the Arab Spring. Consequently, we conclude that these events belong 
more properly to the post-Arab Spring period.  
Following examples in financial stress literature, a set of variables are used in 
constructing the aggregated (country-level) financial stress index for each country that covers 
a broad array of financial indicators and provides valuable information on financial market 
conditions. Compared with individual indicators, aggregated Financial Stress Indices provide 
more accurate and informative measures of financial health and the soundness of a country's 
financial system due to the ability to capture different types of risk and sources of financial 
instability. Using the approach of Apostolakis and Papadopoulos (2015), the Financial Stress 
Indices are calculated based on variance-equal weighting of three sub-indices; the bank 
sector, stock market, and foreign exchange market (for example, the Bahrain Bank Index 
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(BHBI), Bahrain Stock market Index (BHSI), and Bahrain foreign Exchange market Index 
(BHEI)), where an equal weight is assigned to all variables used in the construction process 
(see Eq. 1).  
 
    
              
         
          
             
                                             (1) 
Where;      
        
 
 
    
             
                                                                       (2) 
 
Similarly, Market Stress Indices have been computed based on a variance-equal 
aggregation approach (Eq. (2)) where     stands for standardised financial variables on time t 
and   represents the number of standardised variables used in constructing Financial Stress 
Index for market  . In more detail, the Banking Stress Index comprises three variables; beta 
for the banking sector calculated as a 60-day rolling window of standard beta of capital asset 
pricing model
1
, negative bank equities returns, and bank equities volatility calculated using 
GRACH (1, 1) model. As for the stock market, two measures have been utilised; negative 
stock returns, computed as equities returns multiplied by minus one so a fall in the stock 
returns indicates higher tension in the stock market, along with stock market volatility 
estimated based on a GRACH (1,1) process. Finally, the volatility of the foreign exchange 
market is calculated similarly to the stock market volatility. Following the literature, all 
variables have been standardised before aggregation in order to avoid the problem of 
different units of measurement. 
The variance-equal weighting approach is widely used in the literature and is proven to 
be a very efficient method in constructing financial indices due to the simplicity of 
calculations and its accuracy in representing and signalling financial stress and episodes of 
turbulence (e.g., Cardarelli et al., 2011; Kliesen, Owyang, & Vermann, 2012; MacDonald, 
Sogiakas, & Tsopanakis, 2018). 
 
[Table 1 here] 
 
Table 1 provides descriptive statistics of aggregated FSIs at market-level (panel A-C) as 
well as country-level (Panel D) for the selected MENA economies. In particular, Table 1 
                                               
1
 Due to an estimation of beta banking sectors using 60-days rolling window Financial Stress indices, starting 
from March 23, 2006. 
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shows the first four statistical moments of the underlying series along with normality, 
autocorrelation, heteroscedasticity and stationarity tests. The mean of the Financial Stress 
Indices are very close to zero in all cases and rather small compared to their respective 
standard deviations, with the exception of the Banking Stress Index and Country Stress Index 
for Morocco. The kurtosis statistic is greater than 3 for all the series, suggesting that 
distributions of all series are leptokurtic (higher peaked around the mean with fatter tails 
compared to the normal distribution). It is also worth noting that all the series are skewed 
positively. The departure of the normality assumption has been statistically confirmed by the 
Jarque–Bera test, which rejects the null hypotheses of normality for all series; therefore, none 
of the series are normally distributed. In addition, the Ljung–Box test statistics (Q, Q2) up to 
the 12
th
 order and provides evidence of serial correlation and non-linear dependencies for all 
series.  
The Engle’s LM test for the presence of conditional heteroscedasticity computed using 
12 lags exhibits significant ARCH effects in all the variables, which confirms some stylized 
facts of financial data such as asymmetry, fat tails and volatility clustering; hence, the support 
for the use of GARCH processes for modelling the financial volatilities of the underlying 
series. Finally, Augmented Dickey-Fuller unit root tests have been employed to check the 
time series property of all variables. Results indicate that almost all series are level stationary, 
i.e. I(0), at the 1% significance level, which justifies the use of VAR models in our analysis. 
 
3.2 Empirical Method  
 
We start our empirical analysis with an application of the Diebold and Yilmaz (2009; 
2012) method, which has been widely used in analyses of spillovers across financial markets, 
for example, equities and futures (Yarovaya et al. 2016 a, b) and commodities markets 
(Batten et al. 2010; Batten et al. 2019). We use the Diebold and Yilmaz (2012) framework 
that employs a generalized VAR framework from Koop et al. (1996) and Pesaran and Shin 
(1998), in which variance decompositions are invariant to variables order. The Diebold and 
Yilmaz (2012) framework allows for the estimation of the total, directional, net, and pairwise 
spillover indices and can be applied to a large number of variables. The rolling window 
analysis is also a helpful tool enabling visualisation dynamics of the spillovers during the 
observation period. The output presented in the spillovers tables and plots make the results 
accessible for a non-academic audience because they can be easily interpreted by investors 
and practitioners. These factors have contributed to the popularity of this framework in 
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contemporary finance literature. This method is already well-known, and for that reason we 
do not provide the details of this methodology here. Relevant econometric specifications for 
this framework are available in the Diebold and Yilmaz (2012) paper.  
We further extend our spillover analysis by applying the Barunik and Krehlik (2015; 
2018) frequency connectedness method to identify the dynamics and intensity of spillovers 
between the FSIs of selected MENA countries in time-frequency domain. In contrast to that 
of Diebold and Yilmaz (2012), this framework uses spectral representations of variance 
decomposition locally to retrieve time-frequency (Stiassny, 1996; Dew-becker and Giglio, 
2016). For example, a shock with a strong long-term effect will have high power at low 
frequencies and in the cases where it transmits to other variables, it points to long-term 
connectedness (Barunik and Krehlik, 2018). Barunik and Krehlik (2015) distinguish 
spillovers at high and low frequencies, which is important for investors with different 
investment horizons and trading strategies. This framework has been employed in analysis of 
return spillovers between white precious metal ETFs (Lau et al., 2017), cryptocurrencies 
(Corbet et al. 2018), and other financial assets.   
Consider the spectral behaviour of series    at frequency: 
 
                 
                                                                        (3) 
 
where   is the frequency component, ∞ implies infinite horizon relations in the setting and 
             
     
    (Barunik & Krehlik, 2015). The unconditional generalised 
forecast error variance decomposition on a particular frequency   can be specified as: 
 
          
   
                 
  
   
         
              
   
                                                                          (4) 
 
where Eq. 4 can be standardised as: 
 
           
         
          
 
   
                                                                                                (5) 
 
The accumulative connectedness table (i.e. specified over an informative frequency band) 
proposed by Barunik and Krehlik (2015) allows an arbitrary frequency band         to be  
expressed as: 
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                                                                                                (6) 
 
Therefore, the overall connectedness within the frequency band d can be defined as: 
 
   
        
 
       
           
   
        
 
   
           
                                                                                  (7) 
 
    
           
 
                                                                                                           (8) 
 
    
           
 
                                                                                                           (9) 
 
We also measure the pairwise connectedness between markets using Eq. 10: 
 
    
                                                                                                                    (10) 
 
The contribution of a particular frequency band d to the aggregate measure has to be 
weighted, as: 
  
                                                                                                                        (11) 
 
where the spectral weight      
        
 
     
          
 
        
 
     
 
 is the contribution of frequency 
band d to the whole VAR system and    is the total connectedness measure on the 
connectedness tables (   ) corresponding to an arbitrary frequency of band d. 
 
4. Empirical Results  
 
4.1 Full Sample Analysis  
 
The results are presented in the spillover tables, where entries in columns show the 
spillover from this market to each other, while entries in rows show the received information 
transmitted from each other market to the market selected. Thus, the final column reports 
direction spillovers from other markets to this market, and the final row reports the 
contribution of this index to all other stress indices.  
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First, we perform our analysis for the full sample, March 23, 2006 to July 31, 2018. 
Table 2 tabulates the results of a generalised vector autoregressive framework using Diebold 
and Yilmaz (2012), while Tables 3 and 4 display the results of dynamic frequency 
connectedness tests based on Barunik and Krehlik (2015, 2018) at high and low frequencies, 
respectively.  
[Table 2 here] 
[Table 3 here] 
[Table 4 here] 
 
Findings show that the intensity of spillovers between the FSI indices of MENA 
countries from the period March 23, 2006 to July 31, 2018 was relatively low. The total 
spillover index as per Diebold and Yilmaz (2014) equals 19.76%, and at higher frequencies, 
1- 4 days, as by Barunik and Krehlik (2015), equals 11.15%. We report a higher degree of 
connectedness at lower frequencies (22.02%), which corresponds to 4 days and higher. This 
implies absence of stress spillovers between selected MENA countries in the short term, but 
existence of stress transmission in the long term. 
On part of pairwise connectedness between selected stress indices, the highest spillovers 
are found from Kuwait to Qatar (9.56% as by Diebold and Yilmaz, 2.33% at high 
frequencies, 7.23% at low frequencies) and from Qatar to Kuwait (6.00%, 2.11%, 3.88%), 
from Morocco to Turkey (8.67% as by Diebold and Yilmaz, 8.64% at low frequencies), and 
from Turkey to Morocco (11.26%, 11.24% at low frequencies). All cases support our 
previous arguments that in the long term (at low frequencies) the intensity of spillovers 
between markets is higher, which provides important implications for investors and portfolio 
managers keen to diversify their portfolios in MENA countries and who have relatively long 
investment horizons. According to the results reported in Tables 2, 3, and 4, the most 
influential stress-transmitters in this correlated system are Turkey, Kuwait and Morocco, 
since they contribute more than they receive. The main stress-recipient is Oman as it receives 
more than it transmits from or to the stress indices of other countries. 
Adhering to Barunik and Krehlik (2018), we also preform analysis with and without 
cross-sectional correlation between markets to account for “pure” spillovers between 
markets. The results of variance decomposition might be biased due to strong 
contemporaneous relationships. Therefore, to identify the causal effect of stress transmission 
from one market to another we adjust the correlation matrix of VAR residuals by cross-
sectional correlations (Barunik and Krehlik, 2018). Thus, the results reported in Panel A do 
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not account for cross-sectional correlations, while the results reported in Panel B show the 
values of spillovers with nullified correlations. We note a significant decrease in 
connectedness adjusted for the correlation effect in all Tables 2, 3, and 4. However, it is the 
most pronounced at high frequencies. This  means that the short-term connectedness between 
markets is mainly driven by cross-sectional correlations, while for the long-term 
connectedness we can still identify the causal linkages between markets and observe spillover 
effects. 
 
4.2 Impact of the Arab Spring  
 
In order to analyse the impact of the Arab Spring on the patterns of stress transmission 
between MENA economies, we divided our sample into pre-, during, and after-Arab Spring 
periods, and performed the same combination of tests. Table 5 presents the results of our 
application of the Diebold and Yilmaz (2012) framework to each sub-sample. The most 
interesting observation that can be made here is that the value of the total spillover index for 
the period before the Arab Spring was higher than that during and after this political 
turbulence; 34.20%, 19.77 %, and 8.66% respectively.  
 
[Table 5 here] 
 
More detailed analysis of the values of pairwise spillovers in each observation period 
allows the identification of a few additional strong channels of information transmission 
between selected pairs of FSIs. Thus, a very strong level of intensity of spillovers has been 
found in the pre-Arab Spring period in Turkey to Bahrain (10.51%), Egypt (28.10%), and 
Morocco (14.82%), with Turkey remaining as one of the main transmitters of shocks to other 
MENA countries. Prior to the Arab Spring, the strong spillovers from Egypt to Turkey 
(13.54%), from Kuwait to Qatar (10.31%), and from Morocco to Turkey (7.86%) have been 
reported elsewhere. However, these channels of stress transmission seem to disappear during 
the Arab Spring, since the intensity of spillovers between same markets pairs are very low in 
comparison to the previous period. According to Panel B, Table 5, the most influential 
market in the sample during the Arab Spring is the United Arab Emirates, an assessment that 
also holds good after the Arab Spring (see Panel C, Table 5). This can be explained by the 
fact that the UAE is one of a few Middle Eastern economies that was relatively less affected 
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by the Arab Spring turmoil and managed to maintain its economic growth and development, 
consequently increasing its role in the region.  
We further decomposed the connectedness using the Barunik and Krehlik method (2015; 
2018) to identify the dynamics in the short and long term. Tables 6, 7, and 8 report the results 
for the pre-, during, and post-Arab Spring periods, respectively. For the periods before and 
after the Arab Spring, the connectedness at low frequencies is much higher than at short 
frequencies, which is similar to the whole sample results, and implies stronger stress 
transmission in the long term, as well as a relatively low pace of reaction to the transmitting 
shocks demonstrated by MENA economies. After the Arab Spring, the connectedness 
between markets is relatively low at both high and low frequencies (i.e., 9.15% and 8.46%), 
which indicates that after the political turbulence MENA countries became more isolated 
from external shocks. 
[Table 6 here] 
[Table 7 here] 
[Table 8 here] 
 
The analysis of dynamic connectedness between FSI indices displays a particularly high 
degree of total spillovers at low frequencies before the Arab Spring (39.21%), which remains 
relatively high even when correlation is nullified (22.69%). This clearly indicates the 
presence of causal linkages between MENA economies in this period. These results are very 
revealing because the period before the Arab Spring analysed is from March 23, 2006 to 
December 16, 2010, and includes the Global Financial Crisis. Therefore, further tests of 
robustness are necessary to identify the impact of the Global Financial Crisis on the intensity 
and dynamics of stress spillovers between MENA economies. 
 
4.3 Robustness Test 
 
4.3.1 Impact of the Global Financial Crisis 
The results reported in the previous section suggest a decrease in spillovers between the 
FSI of MENA countries during and after the Arab Spring. We hypothesize that the high 
intensity of stress transmission between indices in pre-Arab Spring periods could be due to 
the impact of the Global Financial Crisis. We follow BIS (2012) guidance to identify the 
beginning and end of the Global Financial Crisis. Thus, we consider that the Global Financial 
Period was from July 2007, which refers to the Credit Crunch, to July 2009, which can be 
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related to the fourth phase of the Global Financial Crisis. Therefore, we re-estimate our 
models in an additional sample from July 2, 2007 to July 2, 2009, giving 524 observations in 
order to compare the results with those found for pre- and during the Arab Spring period. The 
results are presented in Table 9 below.  
 
[Table 9 here] 
 
These tests confirm that the intensity of spillovers was the highest during the time of the 
Global Financial Crisis. The total spillover index during the crisis equals 48.83%, which is 
higher than the value of the total spillover found for the period before the Arab Spring 
(34.20%), and much higher than during the Arab Spring period (19.77%). This indicates that 
the higher intensity of the spillovers before the Arab Spring was due mainly to the contagion 
effect that occurred during the Global Financial Crisis. This result is in line with Maghyereh 
et al. (2015) who reported a significant increase in dynamic correlations and volatility 
spillovers among MENA countries during the global financial meltdown in 2008, and a 
subsequent reversion to lower levels. In addition, the results of dynamic frequency 
decompositions (see above) show that, as with other periods, during the Global Financial 
Crisis the connectedness was driven mainly by the information transmission at lower 
frequencies, suggesting that MENA markets participants are relatively slow in adjusting their 
expectations.   
 
4.3.2 Short-, medium-, and long-term connectedness 
 To further support our results on dynamic spillovers between FSIs of MENA 
countries, we use the Barunik and Krehlik (2018) framework based on spectral representation 
of variance decompositions to analyse connectedness in three different frequency bands; 1 to 
4 days; 4 to 10 days; and 10 days to infinity. We estimate short-, medium-, and long-term 
connectedness for all periods analysed in this paper. The results are presented in Table 10.  
 
[Table 10 here] 
 
With the exception of the post-Arab Spring period, where connectedness between 
markets at all frequencies is very low, for all periods analysed in this paper findings show 
that the connectedness between markets is higher at lower frequencies. The medium-term 
financial connectedness between FSI is higher than short-term-connectedness in all five 
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observation periods considered. Table 10 also clearly illustrates how the degree of spillovers 
varies from period to period. Furthermore, we plot the overall spillovers using a 100-day 
rolling window (Figure 1), which also helps in the visualisation of the dynamics of total 
spillovers across the full sample. 
 
Figure 1 
 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
This paper analyses the stress transmission across eight MENA economies using the 
Financial Stress Index as a proxy for financial stability based on the Diebold and Yilmaz 
(2014) and Barunik and Krehlik (2018) frameworks. Specifically, the paper addresses the 
following questions: (i) What are the key driving force(s) behind the dynamic co-movement 
of financial distress?; (ii) Which country is the net transmitter/receiver of financial stress?; 
and (iii) What is the impact of financial and political disturbances caused by global financial 
crises and the Arab Spring on co-movements and stress spillovers among the MENA 
countries? 
The results reveal that stress transmission in MENA economies occurred due to a high 
spillover effect at lower frequencies, while the short-term connectedness between markets is 
driven primarily by cross-sectorial correlations. This implies the absence of stress spillovers 
in the short term but the existence of spillover effect and causal linkages between markets in 
the long term. Specifically, the decomposition shows a rich time-variation in the dynamics of 
connectedness, changing from an almost total absence of spillovers in the short term (at high 
frequencies) to significant connectedness in the long term (at low frequencies) in all of the 
observation periods analysed. These dynamics imply that MENA markets are too slow in 
adjusting to the information they receive, and in the short term the shocks originating in one 
of the countries will not significantly affect the other MENA markets. The fact that  
connectedness has been driven, in the main, by information transmission at lower 
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frequencies, from 4 days to infinity, indicates that in the long term market participants would 
be able to adjust their understanding and expectations, thus, influencing market behaviour.  
The paper reports the net-transmitters and net-receivers of  information in full, from pre-, 
during- and post-Arab Spring observation periods. The analysis performed for the full 
sample, March 23, 2006 to July 31, 2018, demonstrates that the main stress-transmitters are 
Turkey, Kuwait and Morocco, since they contribute more than they receive, while the main 
stress-recipient is Oman, since it receives more than it transmits from or to other countries’ 
Stress Indices. However, during the Arab Spring the United Arab Emirates becomes the most 
influential market, and this remains the case after the Arab Spring. These results are of great 
importance for managers who determine policy as the information included in this study 
enables the patterns of stress transmission in MENA economies to be revealed. In 
consequence, the findings can be used for the development of a better regulatory framework 
for the maintenance of financial stability in the region. Furthermore, the net-pairwise 
spillover indices reported in this paper can help investors to diversify their portfolios and  
estimate the risk of contagion caused by increased financial and political instability in MENA 
economies more accurately.  
Finally, the value of total spillover index for the period before the Arab Spring was 
higher than that during and after this period of political turbulence. This indicates that after 
the Arab Spring, MENA countries became more isolated from external shocks. However, the 
robustness tests show that the high intensity of stress transmission between indices in pre-
Arab Spring periods was due primarily to the impact of the Global Financial Crisis. This 
paper concludes that the Global Financial Crisis generated a much stronger spillover effect in 
MENA economies than the political turbulence created by the Arab Spring. This conclusion 
has important policy implications, and should be taken into account by financial regulators 
and policy-makers. 
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Table 1 Descriptive Statistics  
 
Countries Bahrain Egypt Kuwait Morocco Oman Qatar Turkey UAE 
Panel A: Banking Sector 
Mean -0.00004 -0.0001 -0.0005 1.2038 -0.0003 -0.0003 0.0005 0.0003 
Std. Deviation 0.6231 0.5979 0.5787 0.6501 0.5864 0.5885 0.5371 0.5895 
Kurtosis 344.2 3.689 5.790 3.218 8.868 7.742 3.562 5.470 
Skewness 10.37 1.090 1.124 1.352 1.697 0.591 1.108 1.637 
J-B Test 1593** 2459** 5165** 2368** 12074** 8212** 2357** 5445** 
Q(12) 2702** 12303** 15510** 16100** 16478** 15866** 12240** 12691** 
Q2(12) 862.7** 4956** 10352** 12401** 8943** 13122** 9851** 4401** 
ARCH (12) 119.2** 193.3** 299.3** 445.7** 284.6** 410.9** 301.9** 219.4** 
ADF -8.69** -8.08** -5.15** -5.96** -5.57** -5.81** -5.92** -8.82** 
         
Panel B: Stock Market 
Mean -0.0002 -0.0001 0.0001 0.0003 -0.0002 0.0001 -0.0006 0.00004 
Std. Deviation 0.7187 0.7081 0.6910 0.7104 0.7042 0.6972 0.7137 0.7161 
Kurtosis 14.74 13.23 183.4 20.13 31.13 269.7 11.02 19.14 
Skewness 2.445 2.512 10.57 3.147 4.452 12.48 2.493 3.309 
J-B Test 32321** 26849** 45692** 59594** 14049** 98273** 19603** 54938** 
Q(12) 5456** 8439** 4622** 3855** 8387** 2323** 7102** 8111** 
Q2(12) 8681** 8519** 6112** 3644** 7095** 3943** 8181** 6633** 
ARCH (12) 369** 307** 319** 319** 277** 196** 299** 271** 
ADF -11.8** -7.50** -9.97** -14.8** -8.13** -10.8** -11.2** -8.95** 
         
Panel C: Foreign Exchange Market 
Mean -0.0001 0.0006 0.0000 -0.0002 -0.0001 0.0000 0.0002 0.0001 
Std. Deviation 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
Kurtosis 308.1 961.5 183.1 7.784 954.5 245.8 35.62 206.6 
Skewness 15.90 29.23 11.82 2.476 25.98 14.20 5.123 13.00 
J-B Test 1.2E+07** 1.2E+08** 4.5E+06** 11404** 1.2E+08** 8.2E+06** 1.8E+05** 5.8E+06** 
Q(12) 12384** 3777** 14428** 36258** 1577** 17627** 26836** 17700** 
Q2(12) 6018** 1252** 5049** 32126** 148.7** 7174** 19720** 8211** 
ARCH (12) 1256** 99.44** 787.3** 11096** 11.15** 1086** 2074** 1332** 
ADF -12.20** -22.50** -13.46** -2.92* -24.31** -8.448** -7.139** -10.45** 
         
Panel D: Country FSIs 
Mean -0.0001 0.0002 -0.0002 0.4005 -0.0002 -0.0001 0.0000 0.0001 
Std. Deviation 0.4788 0.5147 0.4934 0.5980 0.5257 0.4488 0.6176 0.5163 
Kurtosis 81.40 157.6 51.06 7.867 178.5 78.94 19.83 34.69 
Skewness 6.404 8.611 5.612 2.126 8.718 6.323 3.607 4.422 
J-B Test 9.0E+05** 3.3E+06** 3.6E+05** 10712** 4.3E+06** 8.5E+05** 59657** 1.7E+05** 
Q(12) 7913** 6955** 11789** 20435** 5199** 8278** 18989** 12367** 
Q2(12) 5028** 1713** 6041** 15863** 192.3** 6042** 20058** 7908** 
ARCH (12) 773.4** 131.5** 585.1** 820.4** 13.46** 578.9** 1020** 871.6** 
ADF -12.80** -12.90** -8.264** -4.964** -10.91** -10.19** -7.208** -9.599** 
 
Note: This table reports descriptive statistics for financial stress indices data used in the empirical analysis over the full sample starting from 
23 March 2006 to 31 July 2018. J-B is the Jarque–Bera test for the null hypothesis of normality. Q (12) and Q2(12) is the Ljung–Box test for 
serial correlation in raw series and squared residuals up to 12 lag. Similarly, ARCH (12) testing Engle’s ARCH effects up to 12 lags. ADF is 
the Augmented Dickey-Fuller unit root test with a constant term where the lag length is determined by the Schwartz Information Criteria 
(SIC). **, * indicate significant at 1% and 5% level. 
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Table 2 Generalised VAR results  
 
Panel A Connectedness as by DY (2012) 
 FSI_BH FSI_EG FSI_KW FSI_MA FSI_OM FSI_QA FSI_TR FSI_AE FROM 
FSI_BH 87.97 0.25 1.35 0.58 2.02 1.64 3.75 2.43 1.50 
FSI_EG 0.38 87.41 0.52 1.38 0.93 0.51 6.37 2.49 1.57 
FSI_KW 0.48 0.24 80.62  6.27 2.13 6.00 1.48 2.79 2.42 
FSI_MA 0.60 0.64 3.98 78.07 3.13 0.34 11.26 1.97 2.74 
FSI_OM 1.45 0.53 4.59 6.48 71.86 2.92 5.26 6.91 3.52 
FSI_QA 1.58 0.40 9.56 0.45 2.27 79.49 2.24 4.01 2.56 
FSI_TR 1.62 1.85 0.53 8.67 2.65 0.82 78.72 5.15 2.66 
FSI_AE 0.91 1.18 5.68 2.37 3.26 3.29 5.54 77.77 2.78 
TO 0.88 0.64 3.28 3.27 2.05 1.94 4.49 3.22 19.76 
Panel B Connectedness as by DY (2012), nullified correlation 
 FSI_BH FSI_EG FSI_KW FSI_MA FSI_OM FSI_QA FSI_TR FSI_AE FROM 
FSI_BH 96.12   0.00 0.13 0.15 0.11 0.29 3.16 0.03 0.49 
FSI_EG 0.20 95.01 0.06 0.72 0.04 0.20 3.61  0.17 0.62 
FSI_KW 0.03 0.19 89.98 5.90 0.70 2.02 1.06 0.11 1.25 
FSI_MA   0.03 0.01 3.85 84.25 1.68 0.59 9.52 0.06 1.97 
FSI_OM 0.08 0.36 3.41 6.37 85.32 0.36 3.77 0.32 1.83 
FSI_QA 0.96 0.23 0.63 0.21 0.11 94.54 1.82 1.49 0.68 
FSI_TR 0.70 0.04 0.36 7.39 0.54 0.06 90.50 0.41 1.19 
FSI_AE 0.07 0.60 3.15 1.13 0.34 2.38 1.89 90.43 1.20 
TO 0.26 0.18 1.45 2.73 0.44 0.74 3.11 0.32 9.23 
Net Spillovers -0.23  -0.45 0.19 0.76 -1.39 0.06 1.91 -0.87  
Note: This table reports the results estimated for the full sample starting from 23 March 2006 to 31 July 2018. FROM—directional spillover indices measure spillovers from 
all markets j to market i. TO—directional spillover indices measure spillovers from market i to all markets j. Net Spillovers is the difference between TO and FROM 
directional spillovers indices for each market.  
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Table 3 Dynamic connectedness at high frequencies (3.14 to 0.79 corresponds to 1 to 4 days). 
 
Panel A Connectedness as by BK (2015) 
 FSI_BH FSI_EG FSI_KW FSI_MA FSI_OM FSI_QA FSI_TR FSI_AE FROM_ABS FROM_WITH 
FSI_BH 20.36 0.02 0.12 0.10 0.22 0.09 0.03 0.30 0.11 0.53 
FSI_EG  0.06 22.89 0.11 0.06 0.20 0.21 0.27 0.63 0.19 0.93 
FSI_KW 0.10   0.10 17.38 0.02 0.18 2.11 0.03 0.56 0.39 1.87 
FSI_MA 0.06 0.03 0.02 11.58 0.03 0.01 0.02 0.08 0.03 0.15 
FSI_OM 0.25 0.25 0.22 0.05 26.68 0.89 0.25 1.42 0.41 1.97 
FSI_QA 0.10 0.21 2.33 0.05 0.80 21.44 0.09 1.51 0.64 3.07 
FSI_TR 0.03 0.015 0.02 0.03 0.12 0.05 12.13 0.27 0.08 0.40 
FSI_AE 0.25 0.42 0.46 0.13 1.01 1.09 0.35 15.03 0.46 2.24 
TO_ABS 0.11 0.15 0.41 0.05 0.32 0.55 0.13 0.60 2.31  
TO_WTH 0.51 0.71 1.98 0.26 1.54 2.64 0.63 2.88  11.15 
Panel B Connectedness as by BK (2015), nullified correlation  
 FSI_BH FSI_EG FSI_KW FSI_MA FSI_OM FSI_QA FSI_TR FSI_AE FROM-ABS FROM_WTH 
FSI_BH 22.77 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.05 
FSI_EG 0.04 25.41 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.09 0.07 0.03 0.14 
FSI_KW 0.00 0.00 18.30 0.02 0.01 0.04 0.02 0.06 0.02 0.09 
FSI_MA 0.01 0.00 0.03 12.96 0.03 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.06 
FSI_OM 0.00 0.01 0.04 0.07 33.34 0.00 0.13 0.01 0.03 0.16 
FSI_QA 0.02 0.01 0.31 0.04 0.05 25.27 0.05 0.01 0.06 0.28 
FSI_TR 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.03 0.00 14.81 0.02 0.01 0.06 
FSI_AE 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.05 0.02 0.01 0.06 17.10 0.02 0.11 
TO-ABS 0.01 0.00 0.05 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.05 0.02 0.20  
TO_WTH 0.06 0.02 0.26 0.14 0.09 0.04 0.24 0.11  0.95 
Note: The results are based on 100 simulations of VAR with the specified parameters of length 1000 with a burnout period of 100. The estimate is computed as mean of the 
100 observations and the standard error is simple sample standard deviation. 
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Table 4 Dynamic connectedness at low frequencies (0.79 to 0.00 Corresponds to 4 days to Inf. days) 
 
Panel A Connectedness as by BK (2015) 
 FSI_BH FSI_EG FSI_KW FSI_MA FSI_OM FSI_QA FSI_TR FSI_AE FROM-
ABS 
FROM_WTH 
FSI_BH 67.61 0.23 1.23 0.48 1.80 1.56 3.72 2.13 1.39 1.76 
FSI_EG 0.32 64.51 0.41 1.32 0.73 0.31 6.10 1.86 1.38 1.74 
FSI_KW 0.38 0.14 63.24 625 1.95 3.88 1.45 2.23 2.03 2.57 
FSI_MA 0.55 0.62 3.96 66.49 3.10 0.33 11.24 1.89 2.71 3.42 
FSI_OM 1.20 0.28 4.36 6.43 45.18 2.10 5.01 5.49 3.11 3.92 
FSI_QA 1.48 0.19 7.23 0.40 1.47 58.05 2.15 2.50 1.93 2.43 
FSI_TR 1.59 1.70 0.51 8.64 2.53 0.77 66.58 4.88 2.58 3.25 
FSI_AE 0.67 0.76 5.22 2.24 2.25 2.21 5.18 62.73 2.32 2.92 
TO-ABS 0.77 0.49 2.87 3.22 1.73 1.39 4.36 2.62 17.45  
TO_WTH 0.97 0.62 3.62 4.06 2.18 1.76 5.50 3.31  22.02 
Panel B Connectedness as by BK (2015), nullified correlation  
 FSI_BH FSI_EG FSI_KW FSI_MA FSI_OM FSI_QA FSI_TR FSI_AE FROM-
ABS 
FROM_WTH 
FSI_BH 73.35  0.00 0.11 0.15 0.09 0.29 34 001 0.47 0.60 
FSI_EG 0.15 69.60 0.06 0.70 0.04 0.19 3.52 0.09 0.59 0.76 
FSI_KW 0.02 0.19 71.68 5.88 0.70 1.98 1.04 0.05 1.23 1.57 
FSI_MA 0.03 0.01 3.82 71.29 1.65 0.58 9.50 0.06 1.96 2.49 
FSI_OM 0.07 0.34 3.38 6.30 51.98 0.36 3.64 0.31 1.80 2.29 
FSI_QA 0.94 0.22 0.32 0.17 0.06 69.28 1.77 1.49 0.62 0.79 
FSI_TR 0.68 0.04 0.36 7.36 0.52 0.05 75.69 0.39 1.18 1.50 
FSI_AE 0.06 0.59 3.12 1.08 0.32 2.38 1.83 73.33 1.17 1.49 
TO-ABS 0.24 0.17 1.40 2.70 0.42 0.73 3.05 0.30 9.03  
TO_WTH 0.31 0.22 1.78 3.44 0.54 0.93 3.89 0.38  11.49 
Note: The results are based on 100 simulations of VAR with the specified parameters of length 1000 with a burnout period of 100. The estimate is computed as mean of the 
100 observations and the standard error is simple sample standard deviation. 
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Table 5 Generalised VAR results before, during, and after Arab Spring. 
 
Panel A Connectedness as by DY (2012) before Arab Spring, 23/03/2006 - 16/12/2010 
 FSI_BH FSI_EG FSI_KW FSI_MA FSI_OM FSI_QA FSI_TR FSI_AE FROM 
FSI_BH 62.94 3.87 3.20 3.93 4.87 4.54 10.51 6.15 4.63 
FSI_EG 2.35 48.13 1.30 6.78 4.06 2.67 28.10 6.60 6.48 
FSI_KW 1.18 0.91 79.69 7.08 1.75 5.65 1.39 2.35 2.54 
FSI_MA 2.68 5.17 4.51 65.71 3.21 1.50 14.82 2.41 4.29 
FSI_OM 3.16 3.65 4.43 5.92 65.42 3.86 7.10 6.55 4.32 
FSI_QA 3.19  3.21 13.54 2.50 4.03 62.78 5.34 5.40 4.65 
FSI_TR 2.54 10.31 0.46 7.86 2.92 1.76 67.83 6.32 4.02 
FSI_AE 1.80 3.48 5.80 2.70 2.36 2.89 7.09 73.88 3.26 
TO  2.11  3.82 4.14 4.60 2.90 2.86  9.30 4.47  34.20  
Panel B Connectedness as by DY (2012), during Arab Spring, 17/12/2010-31/12/2012 
 FSI_BH FSI_EG FSI_KW FSI_MA FSI_OM FSI_QA FSI_TR FSI_AE FROM 
FSI_BH 92.77 0.48 2.46 1.47 0.68 0.95 0.93 0.26 0.90 
FSI_EG 2.34 92.49 1.23 0.55  0.89 0.60 0.94 0.96 0.94 
FSI_KW 0.45 0.74 77.67 0.80 1.22 5.36 9.54 4.22 2.79 
FSI_MA 0.32 1.22 1.44 77.98 0.27 4.78 2.77 11.23 2.75 
FSI_OM 1.01 1.10 3.223 0.26 83.15 5.13 0.13 6.00 2.11 
FSI_QA 0.83 0.24 4.28  4.02 2.65 70.27 0.25 17.46  3.72 
FSI_TR 0.54 0.18 5.99 3.24 0.56 0.73 83.76 5.00 2.03 
FSI_AE 0.34 0.74 3.56 7.54 3.96 16.87 3.29 63.71 4.54 
TO  0.73 0.59  2.77 2.23  1.28  4.30  2.23  5.64  19.77  
Panel B Connectedness as by DY (2012), post- Arab Spring, 01/01/2013- 31/07/2018 
 FSI_BH FSI_EG FSI_KW FSI_MA FSI_OM FSI_QA FSI_TR FSI_AE FROM 
FSI_BH 98.32 0.12 0.41 0.34 0.16 0.03 0.16 0.45 0.21 
FSI_EG 0.04 95.95 0.24 0.13 0.41 0.52 0.49 2.22 0.51 
FSI_KW 1.00 0.37 82.70 0.07 5.30 2.65 0.13 7.77 2.16 
FSI_MA 0.35 0.07 0.11 96.71 0.87 0.70 1.13 0.06 0.41 
FSI_OM 0.27 0.56 3.37 1.33 85.13 1.67 0.44 7.24 1.86 
FSI_QA 1.01 0.17 1.01 0.31 0.79 94.17 0.17 2.37 0.73 
FSI_TR 0.53 0.38 0.45 0.54 0.74 0.54 96.04 0.76 0.49 
FSI_AE 0.41 1.22 5.95 0.06 5.55 4.45 0.71 81.65 2.29 
TO 0.45  0.36  1.44  0.35  1.73  1.32  0.40  2.61  8.66  
Note: For space consideration the results of DY (2012) with no correlation are not reported here. The values of total spillover indices when correlation 
nullified are 17.42 ,  8.33, and 3.60 in pre-, during, and post Arab Spring periods respectively.  
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Table 6 Dynamic connectedness between FSI before Arab Spring. 
 
Panel A Connectedness as by BK (2015), high frequency, 1-4 days 
  FSI_BH FSI_EG FSI_KW FSI_MA FSI_OM FSI_QA FSI_TR FSI_AE FROM-ABS FROM_WTH 
FSI_BH 27.38 0.16 0.20 0.30 0.52 0.43 0.10 0.66 0.30 1.34 
FSI_EG 0.13 15.56 0.15 0.17 0.42 0.50 0.73 1.36 0.43 1.96 
FSI_KW 0.13 0.19 15.70 0.02 0.12 2.79 0.03 0.48 0.47 2.13 
FSI_MA 0.12 0.12 0.03 10.39 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.18 0.07 0.30 
FSI_OM 0.50 0.67 0.16 0.10 25.04 1.02 0.35 1.26 0.51 2.29 
FSI_QA 0.50 1.10 4.44 0.17 1.37 34.66 0.23 2.36 1.27 5.75 
FSI_TR 0.05 0.40 0.02 0.04 0.12 0.06 7.82 0.26 0.12 0.53 
FSI_AE 0.38 1.08 0.30 0.25 0.74 0.96 0.40 11.14 0.51 2.32 
TO-ABS 0.23 0.46 0.66 0.13 0.41 0.72 0.23 0.82 3.68 
 
TO_WTH 1.03      2.10 3.00 0.59 1.86 3.27  1.06  3.70    16.61  
Panel B Connectedness as by BK (2015), low frequency, 4 days to Inf days. 
 
FSI_BH FSI_EG FSI_KW FSI_MA FSI_OM FSI_QA FSI_TR FSI_AE FROM-ABS FROM_WTH 
FSI_BH 35.56    3.71 3.00 3.62 4.35 4.11 10.41 5.50 4.34 5.57 
FSI_EG 2.22 32.57 1.15 6.61 3.64 2.17 27.37 5.24 6.05 7.77 
FSI_KW 1.05 0.71 63.99 7.06 1.63 2.85 1.36 1.87 2.07 2.66 
FSI_MA 2.57 5.05 4.48 55.32 3.18 1.47 14.78 2.23 4.22 5.42 
FSI_OM 2.66 2.98 4.18 5.83 40.38 2.84 6.75 5.29 3.82 4.90 
FSI_QA 2.68 2.11 9.10 2.33 2.67 28.12 5.11 3.04 3.38 4.34 
FSI_TR 2.49 9.91 0.44 7.83 2.80 1.70 60.01 6.07 3.90 5.01 
FSI_AE 1.42 2.40 5.49 2.46 1.62 1.93 6.69 62.75 2.75 3.53 
TO-ABS 1.88 3.36 3.48 4.47 2.49 2.13 9.06 3.65 30.53 
 
TO_WTH  2.42  4.31  4.47 5.74  3.19 2.74 11.64  4.69     39.21 
Note: For space consideration the results of BK with no correlation are not reported here. The values of total spillover indices when correlation nullified are 
2.57 and 22.69 at high and low frequency bands respectively. 
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Table 7 Dynamic connectedness between FSI during Arab Spring. 
 
 
Panel A Connectedness as by BK (2015), high frequency, 1-4 days 
  FSI_BH FSI_EG FSI_KW FSI_MA FSI_OM FSI_QA FSI_TR FSI_AE FROM-ABS FROM_WTH 
FSI_BH 56.09 0.21 1.12 0.27 0.31 0.08 0.24 0.21 0.31 0.78 
FSI_EG 0.23 37.69 0.46 0.06 0.53 0.29 0.29 0.77 0.33 0.84 
FSI_KW 0.13 0.49 42.31 0.03 0.63 0.85 1.63 1.26 0.63 1.60 
FSI_MA 0.17 0.07 0.02 19.52 0.07 0.24 0.43 0.47 0.18 0.47 
FSI_OM 0.25 0.67 0.69 0.18 37.55 1.42 0.08 3.14 0.80 2.06 
FSI_QA 0.18 0.14 0.55 0.22 2.12 30.03 0.18 5.95 1.17 2.99 
FSI_TR 0.12 0.14  0.85  0.06 0.04 0.18 30.03 0.22 0.20 0.52 
FSI_AE 0.27 0.44 0.66 0.52 2.10 4.26 0.42 22.00 1.08 2.77 
TO-ABS 0.17 0.27 0.54 0.17 0.73 0.92 0.41 1.50 4.70 
 
TO_WTH 0.43  0.69 1.39 0.43 1.85  2.34 1.04  3.84    12.02   
Panel B Connectedness as by BK (2015), low frequency, 4 to Inf. days 
 
FSI_BH FSI_EG FSI_KW FSI_MA FSI_OM FSI_QA FSI_TR FSI_AE FROM-ABS FROM_WTH 
FSI_BH 36.69 0.28 1.35 1.20 0.37 0.86 0.69 0.04 0.60  0.98 
FSI_EG 2.11 54.80 0.76 0.48 0.36 0.32 0.66 0.20 0.61 1.00 
FSI_KW 0.32 0.25 35.36 0.77 0.60 4.51 7.91 2.96 2.17 3.56 
FSI_MA 0.15 1.14 1.41 58.46 0.20 4.54 2.34 10.77 2.57 4.22 
FSI_OM 0.76 0.43 2.54 0.08 45.59 3.70 0.05 2.86 1.30 2.14 
FSI_QA 0.65 0.10 3.74 3.80 0.53 40.24 0.07  11.51 2.55 4.18 
FSI_TR 0.42 0.04 5.13 3.18 0.52  0.55 53.73 4.78 1.83 3.00 
FSI_AE 0.07 0.30 2.90 7.02 1.86 12.60 2.87 41.71 3.45 5.67 
TO-ABS 0.56 0.32 2.23 2.07 0.55 3.39 1.82 4.14 15.08 
 
TO_WTH 0.92  0.52  3.36  3.39  0.91   5.56  3.00  6.79    24.76  
Note: For space consideration the results of BK with no correlation are not reported here. The values of total spillover indices when correlation nullified are 
4.13 and 11.42 at high and low frequency bands respectively. 
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Table 8 Dynamic connectedness between FSI after Arab Spring. 
 
 
Panel A Connectedness as by BK (2015), high frequency, 1-4 days 
  FSI_BH FSI_EG FSI_KW FSI_MA FSI_OM FSI_QA FSI_TR FSI_AE FROM-ABS FROM_WTH 
FSI_BH 13.79 0.00 0.17 0.02 0.05 0.01 0.03 0.12 0.05 0.17 
FSI_EG 0.03 25.08 0.14 0.03 0.06 0.13 0.14 0.26 0.10 0.33 
FSI_KW 0.54 0.19 47.41 0.06 1.65 1.19 0.01 2.25 0.74 2.48 
FSI_MA 0.04 0.03 0.06 28.22 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.09 
FSI_OM 0.08 0.07 1.39 0.02 30.14 0.84 0.16 2.14 0.59 1.98 
FSI_QA 0.00 0.05 0.33 0.01 0.35 10.10 0.02 0.79 0.20 0.66 
FSI_TR 0.06 0.24 0.22 0.01 0.18 0.12 31.78 0.41 0.15 0.52 
FSI_AE 0.14 0.35 1.78 0.00 2.20 2.09 0.35 29.27 0.86 2.91 
TO-ABS 0.11 0.12 0.51 0.02 0.56 0.55 0.09 0.75 2.71 
 
TO_WTH 0.37  0.40 1.72 0.07 1.89  1.86 0.31  2.52    9.15  
Panel B Connectedness as by BK (2015), low frequency, 4 to Inf. days 
 
FSI_BH FSI_EG FSI_KW FSI_MA FSI_OM FSI_QA FSI_TR FSI_AE FROM-ABS FROM_WTH 
FSI_BH 84.53 0.12 0.24 0.32 0.11 0.02 0.13 0.32 0.16 0.23 
FSI_EG 0.01 70.87 0.10 0.09 0.35 0.39 0.35 1.96 0.41 0.58 
FSI_KW 0.46 0.18 35.29 0.01 3.65 1.47 0.12 5.52 1.42 2.03 
FSI_MA 0.31 0.04 0.05 68.49 0.85 0.67 1.11 0.05 0.39 0.55 
FSI_OM 0.19 0.49 1.97 1.30 54.99 0.83 0.28 5.10 1.27 1.81 
FSI_QA 1.00 0.12 0.68 0.30 0.44 84.07 0.14 1.58 0.53 0.76 
FSI_TR 0.48 0.14 0.24 0.52 0.56 0.42 64.27 0.36 0.34 0.48 
FSI_AE 0.27 0.86 4.17 0.06 3.35 2.36 0.37 52.39 1.43 2.03 
TO-ABS 0.34 0.24 0.93 0.33 1.17 0.77 0.31 1.86 5.95  
TO_WTH 
 
0.48 0.35 1.32 0.46 1.66 1.09 0.44 2.65 
 
8.46 
Note: For space consideration the results of BK with no correlation are not reported here. The values of total spillover indices when correlation nullified are 
0.84 and 4.75 at high and low frequency bands respectively. 
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Table 9 Dynamic connectedness between FSI during the Global Financial Crisis. 
 
Panel A Connectedness as by DY (2012)  
  FSI_BH FSI_EG FSI_KW FSI_MA FSI_OM FSI_QA FSI_TR FSI_AE FROM 
FSI_BH 36.36 8.94 3.50 7.23 4.76 9.64 18.49 11.07 7.95 
FSI_EG 7.38 37.70 2.64 5.01 4.13 8.06 26.05 9.02 7.79 
FSI_KW 3.12 3.29 66.30 13.82 1.58 6.14 2.53 3.23 4.21 
FSI_MA 7.52 8.35 9.12 50.90 2.18 6.43 11.95 3.55 6.14 
FSI_OM 6.51 5.59 5.0 5.83 53.24 10.22 6.66 6.96 5.84 
FSI_QA 9.46 8.41 7.14 6.30 6.26 42.89 9.17 10.36 7.14 
FSI_TR 10.02 16.08 0.53 5.09 2.34 5.39 53.25 7.29 5.84 
FSI_AE 6.33 3.84 1.50 5.01 1.97 6.17 6.44 68.74 3.91 
TO 6.29 6.81 3.68 6.04 2.90  6.51  10.16  6.43  48.83  
Panel B Connectedness as by BK (2015), high frequency (1-4 days) 
FSI_BH 11.64 0.26 0.40 0.22 0.67 1.11 0.20 1.05 2.91 
FSI_EG 0.30 9.34 0.19 0.25 0.28 0.90 0.72 0.91 2.64 
FSI_KW 0.39 0.38 10.28 0.10 0.14 0.58 0.08 0.49 1.60 
FSI_MA 0.06 0.14 0.03 6.14 0.03 0.14 0.02 0.21 0.46 
FSI_OM 1.20 0.70 0.20 0.30 22.23 2.51 0.37 1.40 4.97 
FSI_QA 2.13 2.25 1.06 0.52 2.78 22.89 0.27 3.79 9.51 
FSI_TR 0.14 0.38 0.06 0.05 0.13 0.08 6.86 0.23 0.79 
FSI_AE 0.97 1.10 0.48 0.43 0.74 1.84 0.38 8.39 4.42 
TO_WTH  3.86 3.87  1.79 1.38 3.54  5.33  1.52  6.01  27.30  
Panel B Connectedness as by BK (2015), low frequencies (4 days to Inf.) 
FSI_BH 24.72 8.68 3.11 7.01 4.09 8.53 18.28 10.02 8.97 
FSI_EG 7.09 28.36 2.45 4.77 3.85 7.16 25.32 8.11 8.83 
FSI_KW 2.73 2.91 56.02 13.72 1.44 5.56 2.45 2.73 4.74 
FSI_MA 7.46 8.20 9.09 44.75 2.16 6.29 11.94 3.33 7.28 
FSI_OM 5.30 4.89 4.80 5.53 31.01 7.70 6.29 5.56 6.02 
FSI_QA 7.34 6.16 6.09 5.79 3.49 20.00 8.91 6.56 6.66 
FSI_TR 9.89 15.70 0.47 5.04 2.21 5.31 46.39 7.06 6.87 
FSI_AE 5.36 2.75 1.02 4.58 1.23 4.33 6.06 60.35 3.80 
TO_WTH  6.79 7.41  4.06  6.98  2.78  6.74  11.91  6.52  53.18 
Note: For space consideration the results of both DY and BK with no correlation are not reported here. The values of total spillover indices when correlation 
nullified for DY is 25.54% and for BK are 4.33% and 31.86% at high and low frequency bands respectively. 
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Table 10 Short-, medium-, and long-term connectedness. 
 
Period Short-term, 1 to 4 days  Medium-term, 4 to 10 days  Long-term, 10 days to Inf. 
Before Arab Spring  
23/3/2006 -16/12/2010 
16.61 21.76 43.69 
During the Global Financial Crisis  
02/07/2007 –02/07/2010  
27.30 34.15 56.63 
During the Arab Spring  
17/12/2010 - 31/12/2012 
12.02 17.15 29.32 
After Arab Spring  
01/01/2013 -31/07/2018 
9.15 9.59 7.97 
Full Sample  
23/03/2006-31/07/2018 
11.15 12.71 24.75 
Note: Table reports the results of short-, medium, and long-term connectedness obtained for each of the sub-samples. The detailed results for each frequency 
bands are available upon request.   
 
 
 
  
Financial Stress Dynamics in the MENA Region: Evidence from 
the Arab Spring 
Highlights 
• We analyse the financial stress transmission in the MENA region;
• The short-term connectedness is mainly driven by cross-sectional correlations;
• Results display existence of stress transmission in the long term;
• After Arab spring MENA countries became more isolated from the external shocks;
• High intensity of stress spillovers before Arab spring was due to the GFC. 
